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THE NATURE OF THE STUDY
ONE OF the most frequently discussed tax reforms to encourage
capital expenditures is the liberalization of provisions determin-
ing the computation of deductible depreciation charges. During
the postwar period, two major reforms of this nature took place.
The first permitted firms to use "accelerated" tax depreciation
formulas (such as double declining balance and sum-of-the-years
digits) which increase depreciation charges in the early years of
the life of a plant or piece of equipment and decrease them in the
later years. The second reform provided for the use of shorter
service lives for tax purposes, thereby increasing depreciation
charges during the course of the shortened tax life.1
This study is primarily an investigation of the effects of such
changes on modernization expenditures in the textile industry.
In addition, attention is given to the effects within the industry
of the introduction of investment tax credit in 1962 (see Chapter
7).
The investigation relies principally on in-depth interviews with
executives of twenty-five textile firms, supplemented by data pro-
vided by most of these firms or gleaned from published financial
reports. Background information was secured by interviews with
executives of five leading textile machinery manufacturers and a
number of persons with legal, governmental, engineering, or trade
association experience closely related to the industry.
1 These twoformsof depreciation have similar but not identical tax effects.
Both are discussed in Chapter 2. Another suggested approach to depreciation lib-
eralization is to substitute rep]acement cost for original cost as the basis for making
depreciation deductions. No action has yet been taken in the United States on
this proposal, however. Cf. Norman B. Ture, Accelerated Depreciation in the
United States, 1954—60, New York, NBER, 1967, p. 4, fn. 4.2 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
The textile industry was selected for special study for two rea-
sons. First, the industry not only benefited by the general liberal-
ization of depreciation under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
but also was permitted radical shortening of its permissible tax
life on basic textile equipment under the provisions of a special
tax procedure in October 1961.2Thelatter occurred three-fourths
of a year earlier than the general depreciation reform under IRS
Revenue Procedure 62-21, July 1962, and thereby provided an op-
portunity for observing the response to the availability of short-
ened depreciation lives over a somewhat longer period.
Second, the particular circumstances of the American textile
industry suggested that an investigation into the effect of de-
preciation liberalization on modernization might be fruitful. Not
only was the industry widely considered to be technologically
backward—more so than most other U.S. industries—but, simul-
taneously, the opportunities for technical progress were deemed
to be abundant due to significant advances in recent years.8 This
set of circumstances—widespread obsolescence combined with
abundant modernization opportunities—made the industry one
2TheOctober 1961 change in Treasury regulations authorized firms in the textile
industry to use materially shorter lives for purposes of computing depreciation on
tax returns than those stipulated in the Internal Revenue Service Bulletin F which
previously had been in force. We shall see in Chapter 3 that in practice this basis
was by no means always the standard used for tax depreciation.
Whether or not the industry was technologically "backward" cannot be em-
pirically established. It is clear, however, that the industry had passed through
years of overcapacity during which rates of return on invested capital were very
low and equipment was gradually worn out and retired from use. The history of
the industry from 1919 until the years immediately after the Second World War
was a classic demonstration of movements toward long-run equilibrium under con-
ditions of overcapacity and a series of historical incidents which served to retain
the condition of overcapacity. These incidents included the development of textile
manufacturing in the South, the discovery and implementation of second (and,
later, third)shift operation, and the development of the rayon and synthetics
branch of the industry. Cf. Thomas M. Stanback, Jr., "The Textile Cycle: Charac-
teristics and Contributing Factors," Southern Economic Journal, XXV,No.2,
1958, p. 187. John Kendrick's estimates of capital input provide evidence of the
quantitative decline of capital utilized within the textile mill products industry
during the pre-Worid War II years. His capital input index for the industry in
1919 stood at 115.1 (the year 1929 equals 100). By 1937 it had fallen to 71.1; in
1948 it had risen to only 78.5, and in 1953 stood at 87.8. John W. Kendrick,
Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton, N.J., 1961, p. 469. See also
"Age of Existing Equipment," below, p. 9.NATURE OF STUDY 3
in which the operation of tax factors might most readily be
observed.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Segments of the Industry Studied
From the outset this study has been limited to three sectors of
the textile industry (i.e., textile mill products industry): cotton
broadwoven goods, synthetic broadwoven goods, yarn and thread
mills (cotton system spinning). These three groups comprised
49 per cent of the textile mill products industry in 1962 when
measured in terms of production workers (43 per cent when
measured in terms of value added) and accounted for 54 per
cent of capital expenditures.4
The reason for restricting the study to these groups was that,
in terms of processes and equipment used and economic condi-
tions which surround the investment decision, they comprise a
more homogeneous sector than do the remainder, yet offer a vari-
ety of experience for analysis.
Chart 1 pictures graphically the capital investment experience
of the industry since 1950, contrasting the three groups under
survey with the remainder of the industry. Expenditures by the
groups studied have dominated the pattern of total expenditures
for the industry.
Firms Interviewed
Although the firms interviewed may not be regarded as com-
prising a scientifically stratified sample, every effort was made
to select a useful cross section of those sectors of the textile in-
dustry under study. In selecting the sample we relied heavily
upon suggestions by executives of the American Textile Manu-
facturers' Institute and of two textile machinery companies, as
well as several textile executives possessing a broad familiarity
with the industry. The executives were asked to suggest a list of
firms which would include large, medium, and small companies,
both publicly and privately held, and would represent the van-
Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 1962, U.S. Department of Commerce, p. 82.4 TAX CHANGESIN THETEXTILEINDUSTRY
CHART 1. Capital Investment Expenditures; Total Textile Mill
Products, Cotton and Synthetic Broadwoven Goods
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ous general types of cotton and synthetic fabrics produced as
well as yarn and thread manufacturers. The list was also to include
firms with highly aggressive modernization policies and those with
relatively unaggressive ones as well. Finally, every effort was
made to secure a geographically representative sample. Firms
were interviewed in Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama.5
Among the firms interviewed, eight (32 per cent) may be classi-
fied as "large," with sales in excess of $150 million in 1963, ten
(40 per cent) as "medium" with sales of $50—150 million, and
seven (28 per cent) as "small," sales under $50 million.6 Among
the eight large firms six were publicly held, two closely held.7
Among the medium-sized firms, four were publicly held and six
closely held. Among the seven small firms only one was publicly
held. Twenty-one of the firms produced cotton or synthetic broad-
woven goods or both. The remaining four specialized in yams
or threads.
Executives Interviewed
Persons interviewed were in every instance experienced, senior
officials. Since the study had received the endorsement of the tax
committee of the American Textile Manufacturers' Institute, ex-
ecutives were cooperative in granting interviews and entered into
the interview process in an interested and helpful spirit.
In six of the firms contacted, the senior executive interviewed
was president, in four other cases executive vice president, in
still another case director of research and development (but very
deeply involved in his firm's investment decisions).
Although a variety of experience in times of profitability was not a formal
criterion, the evidence from company records indicates that there was, in fact, a
high degree of representativeness in this regard. See pages 32—33.
6Theabove definition of "large," "medium," and "small" in terms of sales
volume is based upon analysis of published sales data for textile firms. Discussion
with knowledgeable persons in the industry revealed that the classification is also
consistent with general usage.
Firms are regarded as closely held if they were, entirely or predominately,
owned and managerially dominated by a single individual or small group. In
almost every instance the interview indicated clearly that the firm was either
publicly held and sensitive to stockholder relations or closely held and insensitive
to such relations.6 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
In the majority of cases (fourteen of the firms), however, the
senior executive interviewed was the financial officer, usually of
vice presidential rank. As such he was familiar with company de-
preciation policy and investment practices and, interestingly
enough, usually appeared to be quite conversant with textile tech-
nology and familiar with operating experience in the mill.
Interviews were not typically confined to one executive in each
firm, however. In fifteen of the twenty-five firms more than one
executive was interviewed. These other executives were some-
times financial officers, but in a number of instances were respon-
sible for some phase of production.
Timing of theInterviews
The interviews were conducted during the spring and summer
of 1963. This fact must be kept in mind as we assess the inter-
view material, for it imposes certain restrictions upon the evi-
dence. At the time of interview most firms had had substantial
experience with the accelerated depreciation provisions of the
1954 Internal Revenue Code.8 On the other hand, while most of
the firms had had roughly a year and a half of experience with
the special depreciation provisions of 1961,° they had had less
than a year's experience with the new depreciation rules in IRS
Revenue Procedure 62-21 '°andthe provisions of the investment
8TheInternal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for the use of accelerated depre-
ciation allowances for all new, depreciable property, newly acquired after 1953,
which is used in the taxpayer's trade or business. The depreciation provisions of
the Code expressly authorize taxpayers to use the declining-balance method with
an annual depreciation rate equal. to twice the straight-line rate, the sum-of-the-
years digits method, or any other method which would not result in cumulative
charges during any year in the first two-thirds of the asset's life which would be
in excess of those generated by use of the declining balance method. Cf. Norman
B. Ture, Accelerated Depreciation, for a detailed explanation of these provisions.
On October 11, 1961, President Kennedy announced that thereafter taxpayers
might base depreciation allowances for all basic textile equipment except finishing
equipment on a service life of fifteen years and in the case of finishing equipment
on a service life of twelve years. Prior to the announcement, the service lives sug-
gested in the Internal Revenue Service's Bulletin F were twenty-five years and
fifteen years respectively. The new estimated useful lives were applicable for all
properties with a remaining useful life of more than five years. For assets pre-
viously acquired the method of writing off the remaining cost (undepreciated
value) varied according to type of depreciation in use.
10InJuly 1962 the Treasury Department issued Revenue Procedure 62-21,
superseding Bulletin F and substantially revising the approach for determiningNATURE OF STUDY 7
credit in the Revenue Act of 1962.11Oneof the investment, credit
proYisions required reducing the depreciable basis of assets on
which the credit was claimed by the amount of the credit. Since
the credit was mandatory, this provision, in effect, mitigated the
liberalizing of the depreciation rules under the 1961 and 1962
administrative procedures. The reduction-of-basis provision in the
credit was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1964.
The timing of the study permitted observation of the opinions
and reactions of the sampled firms during the early history of the
respective tax changes. It is possible, however, that somewhat
different answers might have been received had the interviews
been conducted at a later date. There is substantial evidence, for
example, that the initial response of firms to the availability of
accelerated depreciation methods in the 1954 Revenue Code was
quite limited and that the use of these methods increased year
by year as more companies came to realize the advantages af-
forded by these provisions.'2
The Questionnaire
All interviews were based on the questionnaire shown in Ap-
pendix A. Every effort was made, however, to avoid a mechanical
presentation or rigid adherence to the questionnaire. The se-
quence of questions was altered on the spot, allowing the execu-
tive to move naturally from one topic to another, exploring each
useful lives. Applicability of the guidelines is at the taxpayer's election; he may,
if he chooses, continue on the earlier guidelines.
The Revenue Procedure presents useful lives on a broad industry grouping rather
than on the old Bulletin F item-by-item basis. In contrast with the 5,000 or so
items in Bulletin F, the Procedure designates less than 100 asset classes; one class
will normally cover substantially all the productive machinery and equipment used
in an industry. Certain general purpose assets as office equipment fall into guide-
line classes that cross industry lines.
As originally issued, the Procedure permitted a taxpayer to use the suggested
guideline lives without question for an initial three year period. After this period
he might continue to use them as long as they are consistent with actual service
lives as demonstrated by his retirement practice. The taxpayer is free to use shorter
than guideline lives if he can demonstrate that retirement practice justifies such a
policy. A subsequent ruling extended the initial three year period.
As originally enacted, a credit against tax liability in the amount of 7 per cent
of the cost of depreciable property other than structures was allowed, subject to
certain limitations regarding the service life of the property and other factors.
12 Cf. Ture, Accelerated Depreciation.8 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
with as much thoroughness as time and his inclination would
permit.
The questionnaire is divided into a number of sections. The
first (initiation of requests for capital expenditure) is designed
to provide an indication of the type of capital budgeting pro-
cedures employed, the second (the investment formula) to de-
termine the type of formula used and the manner of its compu-
tation. The third section (other factors influencing the invest-
ment decision) explores a number of factors, other than straight-
forward computations of expected savings or increased revenues,
which influence the investment decision; and the fourth (modifi-
cation of old equipment versus purchase of new) focuses on a
particular type of modernization expenditure problem: whether
to modify existing equipment or to purchase new.
The questionnaire then turns to financial and tax matters. The
fifth section (financial considerations: internal and external fi-
nancing) is comprised of a number of questions designed pri-
marily to determine the firm's experience and practices with
regard to internal and external financing. The sixth (deprecia-
tion) explores the company's experience with liberalized depre-
ciation—its understanding of possible benefits, its estimate of the
actual influence of liberalized depreciation, its attitude toward
further liberalization. The seventh (investment credit) contains
similar questions relating to the investment credit. Remaining
sections (corporate income tax, effect of cyclical fluctuations, and
summing-up) permit comparison of the executives' reactions to
proposed income tax changes with those already given in refer-
ence to depreciation liberalization as well as an assessment of the
role of cyclical changes and of the major factors influencing
modernization in recent years.
NATURE OF MODERNIZATION OUTLAYS AND
THE SUITABILITY OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
FOR STUDY OF SUCH EXPENDITURES
Modernization outlays can be defined as those made to replace
existingfacilities with new ones which will afford reductions inNATURE OF STUDY 9
variable unit costs at the same level of output. Such outlays may
be contrasted on the one hand with outlays for facilities to be
used for increasing total output without reduction of units costs
and on the other with simple replacement affording no produc-
tion economies.
The distinction is often an easy one to make in the practical
terms of the corporate executives interviewed in this study,
but it is far from rigorous analytically. A capital outlay which
reduces variable unit costs of a given level of output must free
one or more inputs in the production process for additional in-
come generation. For the same production budget, therefore, a
greater total income flow can be generated as a result of the mod-
ernization outlays. In this sense modernization and expansion
amount to the same thing. However, modernization outlays may
result in somewhat different variable unit costs of output at some
other rate of production, i.e., modernization outlays probably re-
suit in a change in the shape of the relevant cost curves, whereas
expansion outlays change the position of such curves without
altering their configuration. In real life, of course, modernization
and expansion objectives probably are combined, or not dis-
tinguished, in investment programs more often than they are
deliberately separated.
The textile industry is especially well suited for the study of
tax influences on modernization-type capital outlays. Much of
the equipment in use is old and change in the textile technol-
ogy available for implementation has been rapid in recent years.
Moreover, the nature of this change and of the production
processes involved has made it possible for firms to modernize
equipment on a piecemeal basis without facing the special diffi-
culties involved in industries where entire plants must be replaced
if modernization is to occur.
Age of Existing Equipment
The following estimate of the installation dates of machinery
in use in 1960 was made available to the author by the American
Textile Machinery Association.10 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
Percentage
Percentage Installed Prior to
1920 1940 1950 1950—60
Picking 36 69 86 14
Cards 73 81 90 10
Drawing 11 55 85 15
Combing 10 21 76 24
Roving 10 38 73 27
Spinning 22 59 81 19
Looms 27 45 75 25
Although this estimate may not take full account of modifica-
tions made to old equipment, it appears to indicate that a very
large proportion of the basic equipment in all of the major textile
production processes was not less than ten years old and in most
of them twenty to forty years old. In itself, this observation does
not prove that the industry has not made the most of its decision
regarding capital facilities to be used in the various production
processes. Financial considerations play an important role in con-
nection with the decision to modernize, modify, or make do with
existing facilities. The mere fact of engineering advance does not
dictate the choice of modernization; the costs of implementing
these advances in the production process may be so great that,
given the conditions of demand for output, greater net returns
may be realized by relatively minor modification of existing pro-
duction techniques or even staying with existing processes than
by undertaking replacement on a large scale. Economically speak-
ing (i.e., from the point of view of profit maximization) the best
capital program for the firm and industry might involve passing
up the glamorous, technically superior production processes until
they become competitive on a cost basis.
By the same token, a change in the system of financial con-
straints—for example, those resulting from liberalization of de-
preciation rules—might make practicable the implementing of
hitherto unprofitable technical advances. It is in this connection
that the present study focuses on the consequences of the 1961—62
tax changes on the state of technical advance in the textile in-
dustry.NATURE OF STUDY 11
Improvements in Textile Technology
All evidence points to a rapid rate of improvement in textile
technology in the postwar period. For example, a Department of
Commerce engineer interviewed in early 1963 estimated that, on
an engineering basis, drawing equipment had increased in pro-
ductive efficiency by 300 per cent since 1958, combers had
improved by 138 per cent, and spinning equipment by 96 per
cent. While no precise quantitative estimate was given, he also
expressed the view that technical advance in looms was also
high.
Further evidence, of the same sort but in greater detail, may
be found in Profit Life of Textile Machinery, and in the Whiten
Machine Works studies of output and labor inputs for a com-
parable mill in 1956 and
Nature of the Production Processes
The production of cloth, though it involves a number of pro-
cesses extending from the breaking of the bale, in the case of
cotton, to the final inspection of the woven fabric, is not a con-
tinuous process industry. Textile engineers state that in no other
industry are there as many machine processes which are com-
paratively independent of one another, i.e., an individual machine
may be replaced independently of the remainder of the facilities.
Moreover, postwar developments in textile technology have
involved improvements in basic processes and the development
of auxiliary equipment rather than radical breakthroughs calling
upon new engineering principles. In general, modern textile
equipment is faster, more efficient, and turns out a higher quality
product than the equipment which it replaces, but it neverthe-
less employs time-honored engineering principles. In spite of
very dramatic breakthroughs in fiber technology and the textile
industry's adoption of these new fibers, today's basic weaving,
spinning, and allied processes are similar to those employed for
13AmericanTextile Machinery Association, Profit Life of Textile Machinery
(prepared by Mildred Andrews), Vienna, Va., 1958; and The Whiten Review,
December 1956 (pp. 9—19), March 1957 (pp. 26—36), December 1961, Whitens-
yule, Mass.12 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
many years. At the time of the interviews the automated mill
existed only in prototype form and two of the most promising
developments in textile technology, the shuttleless loom and au-
tomatic doffing, were being used only to a limited extent.'4 As
of the fall of 1965, some new mills were employing a significant
degree of automation and automatic doffing was finding wider
use. The industry anticipates very rapid technological advances
in the years ahead.'5
Still another consideration is the uneven progress of textile
technology: development tending to focus first on one stage of
production, then on another.
The result of this combination of circumstances is that mills
have been presented with a series of modernization opportuni-
ties. The importance of each opportunity has varied from mill
to mill depending upon the age and efficiency of existing equip-
ment and on the product line produced. There seems to be gen-
eral agreement, however, that for most firms the postwar years,
especially those immediately preceding the interviews, were a
period of more or less continuous opportunity for modernization.'6
MODERNIZATION VERSUS MODIFICATION
Another result of the technological developments characteristic
of the textile industry is that improvements in equipment design
have frequently presented management with the alternative of
modifying old equipment in order to incorporate some or all of
the new design features rather than of purchasing new equip-
ment.
Liberalized depreciation may, under certain conditions, act to
alter the decision in such a way as to encourage replacement of
14Thedoffing process is that of removing, and replacing, the "quills" from the
spinning machines when they are filled with newly spun yarn. Until recently this
was done entirely by hand.
15Foran interesting description of recent developments in textile technology see
the series of three articles, "Textile Automation Mounts Worldwide," "Automated
Textile Plants Grow," and "Textile Machinery Changes Speeded," Journal of Corn-
inerce,July 7, 8, 9, 1965.
16Forinterview evidence see Chapter 4, pp. 56—58.NATURE OF STUDY 13
old equipment with new, modern equipment rather than modi-
fication.
An indication of the importance of modification as a method of
modernizing is found in statistics of the American Textile Manu-
facturers' Institute on the number of cotton system spindles re-
built or newly installed during the years 1960—63. Rebuilt spin-
dles exceed new ones in each of the years as follows: 17





Further, according to the Census of Manufactures, 53 per cent
of shipments of textile machinery producers in 1954 and 52 per
cent in 1958 were in the form of machinery parts.'8 According
to one leading textile machinery manufacturer, parts sales have
comprised as much as 70 per cent of total sales in some years.
THE PLAN OF THE STUDY
The chapter which follows sets forth three possible routes by
which liberalized depreciation may influence modernization out-
lays. Briefly, depreciation legislation may act to increase expendi-
tures by increasing the incentive to spend (the demand effect),
by making available a larger flow of internal funds on terms man-
agement considers to be favorable (the cash flow effect), or by
altering management attitudes toward modernization expendi-
hires as a result of the changes which occur in bookkeeping
charges within the firm's accounting system.
Chapter 3 provides background information relating principally
to the interviewed firms' experience in adopting the depreciation
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the special tax
17See"Ten Years of Cotton Textiles, 1954—64," a brochure published by Ameri-
can Textile ManUfacturers' Institute, Inc.
18 1958 Census of Manufactures, Vol. II, Part 2,p. 35, D15.14 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
provision of 1961, and Revenue Procedure 62-21 (1962). It also
presents evidence relating to executive attitudes toward treating
depreciation charges differently for tax and accounting purposes,
an important consideration in evaluating the third route noted
above.
Chapters 4 and 5 then present evidence relating to the influ-
ence of liberalized depreciation upon the executive's decision to
spend for modernization as it acts through each of the three
routes.
Chapter 6 presents an evaluation of executive reaction to the
investment credit during the short period that the credit was in
force prior, to the interviews. It also sums up the previous evi-
dence and evaluates the combined influence of the two types of
legislation. Finally, Chapter 7summarizesthe evidence and find-
ings.